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This thesis tests the three hypotheses derived from the written opinion of Justice 
Thurgood Marshall in Furman v Georgia in 1972. Subjects completed questionnaires at the 
beginning and the end of the fall 2006 semester. Experimental group subjects were enrolled in a 
death penalty class, while control group subjects were enrolled in another criminal justice class. 
The death penalty class was the experimental stimulus. Findings provided strong support for the 
first and third hypotheses, i.e., subjects were generally lacking in death penalty knowledge 
before the experimental stimulus, and death penalty proponents who scored “high” on a 
retribution index did not change their death penalty opinions despite exposure to death penalty 
knowledge. Marshall’s second hypothesis--that death penalty knowledge and death penalty 
support were inversely related--was not supported by the data. Two serendipitous findings were 
that death penalty proponents who scored “low” on a retribution index also did not change their 
death penalty opinions after becoming more informed about the subject, and that death penalty 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to test “The Marshall Hypotheses.” These hypotheses were 
postulated by Justice Thurgood Marshall in his decision in the case of Furman v. Georgia (408 
U.S. 238, 1972): 
1. The American people are largely ignorant about the administration of capital punishment. 
2. An informed American public would not support the death penalty. 
3. If the primary reason people support capital punishment is based on the principle of 
retribution, then increased knowledge about the subject would make little or no 
difference to their death penalty opinions.  
This research is important because the death penalty in the United States appears to be 
driven by public opinion. Indeed, Bohm (2003) states that it would be very difficult to sustain the 
penalty where the public does not support it. Unfortunately, many studies (described later) have 
found that public opinion about the death penalty is not only poorly informed, but often 
misinformed. The problem, as Justice Marshall recognized, is that the public’s decision about 
whether an individual lives or dies, that is, its choice about the death penalty, should be “a 
knowledgeable choice” (Furman v. Georgia, 1972 at 362, fn.145). 
Furman v. Georgia and the Marshall Hypotheses 
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court (the Court) decided three cases regarding the 
constitutionality of the death penalty as it was applied at the time. The cases were Furman v. 
Georgia (408 U.S. 238) consolidated with Jackson v. Georgia (No. 69-5-30) and Branch v. 
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Texas (No. 69-5031). The Branch and Furman cases dealt with the death penalty’s 
constitutionality with respect to murder, whereas the Jackson case dealt with the same penalty, 
but for the crime of rape (in the absence of murder). 
 The question before the Court was: Does “the imposition and carrying out of the death 
penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments” (Furman v. Georgia, 1972 at 239).  In one of the lengthiest Supreme 
Court decisions in its history, the Court held, by a 5-4 ruling, that the death penalty was indeed 
unconstitutional. Every justice wrote an opinion. That the justices were so forceful and singular 
in their views, and so narrowly split, tended to show that the Supreme Court was a microcosm of 
the powerfully held and diverse views of the general public. Justices Douglas, Stewart and White 
wrote that the death penalty was indeed unconstitutional, but not irredeemably so. In contrast, the 
remainder of the majority, Justices Brennan and Marshall, declared the death penalty to be 
unconstitutional in all cases. The Court’s rationale for the death penalty’s unconstitutionality was 
that the penalty was carried out in an arbitrary and capricious manner, with many of the justices 
citing racial concerns as particularly troublesome (Furman v. Georgia, 1972). The outcome of 
the Court’s ruling was the voiding of all existing death penalty statutes, and the commutation of 
the sentences of all condemned inmates to either life without the possibility of parole or, in some 
instances, life with the possibility of parole. 
 In Marshall’s Furman opinion, he wrote that if the American public’s death penalty 
opinion was going to be probative, it was a constitutional necessity that the public should be 
knowledgeable of the death penalty and that this knowledge should be discerned (Furman v. 
Georgia, 1972 at 362, fn. 145). Justice Marshall explained, “The question with which we must 
deal is not whether a substantial proportion of American citizens would today, if polled, opine 
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that capital punishment is barbarously cruel, but whether they would find it to be so in the light 
of all information presently available” (Furman v. Georgia, 1972 at 362). In clarification, 
Marshall further remarked, “This is not to suggest that with respect to this test of 
unconstitutionality people are required to act rationally; they are not. With respect to this 
judgment, a violation of the Eighth Amendment is totally dependant on the predictable, 
subjective, emotional reactions of informed citizens” (my emphasis) (Furman v. Georgia, 1972 
at 362).  
As noted, in his first hypothesis Marshall presumed that most Americans are not 
knowledgeable about the death penalty, which begs the question what Americans must know if 
they are to be considered informed about the death penalty. In Furman, he suggested the 
following:  
that the death penalty is no more effective a deterrent than life imprisonment, that 
convicted murderers are rarely executed but usually sentenced to a term in prison; that 
convicted murderers usually are model prisoners, and that they almost always become 
law abiding citizens upon their release from prison; that the costs of executing a capital 
offender exceed the costs of imprisoning him for life; that while in prison, a convict 
under sentence of death performs none of the useful functions that life prisoners perform; 
that no attempt is made in the sentencing process to ferret out likely recidivists for 
execution; and that the death penalty may actually stimulate criminal activity (Furman v. 
Georgia, 1972 at 364, footnotes omitted). 
 
Marshall believed, as suggested in his second hypothesis, that “[t]his information would surely 
convince average citizens that the death penalty was unwise” (Furman v. Georgia, 1972 at 364). 
 Regarding his third hypothesis, Marshall recognized that even if Americans knew the 
aforementioned information, they still may not consider the death penalty morally reprehensible 
and oppose it. The reason, according to Marshall, is that many Americans support the death 
penalty primarily for retributive reasons, and retributivists are less likely to respond to 
knowledge-based claims. On the subject of retribution, Marshall wrote, “Retaliation, vengeance, 
 4
and retribution have been roundly condemned as intolerable aspirations for a government in a 
free society” (Furman v. Georgia, 1972 at 343). He went on to posit, “The history of the Eighth 
Amendment supports only the conclusion that retribution for its own sake is improper” (Furman 
v. Georgia, 1972 at 345) and that “no one has ever seriously advanced retribution as a legitimate 
goal of our society” (Furman v. Georgia, 1972 at 363). Marshall’s view of retribution, which he 
equated with purposeless vengeance, was so negative that he maintained: 
I cannot believe that at this stage in our history, the American people would ever 
knowingly support purposeless vengeance. Thus, I believe that the great mass of citizens 
would conclude on the basis of the material already considered that the death penalty is 
immoral and therefore unconstitutional (Furman v. Georgia, 1972 at 363-364). 
 
It is clear from his previous remark he was using the precedent set by the Court’s decision in 
Trop v. Dulles (356 U.S. 86, 1958 at 102) that a punishment must be judged in terms of “the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” 
Testing the Marshall Hypotheses 
 The bold statements made by Justice Marshall in such a landmark case drew almost 
immediate attention and study from many social scientists due to its far reaching scope and 
originality of thought. A literature review revealed seventeen studies that tested all or part of the 
Marshall hypotheses. Table 1 shows the studies and what part of the Marshall hypotheses they 
tested. However, there were problems with the testability of the hypotheses from the start: What 
constitutes knowledge, and how is it to be measured? What constitutes death penalty opinion, 
and how is it to be measured? What constitutes retributive reasons for death penalty support, and 
how are they to be measured? In addition, previous studies of the Marshall Hypotheses faced 
problems with sampling method, the time and context in which the data were gathered, and the 
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stimuli used to make subjects more knowledgeable. The review of this literature examines the 
previous studies in light of these problems and reports the methods they employed, their 
findings, and their relative strengths and weaknesses.   
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Table 1 
Studies that Tested All or Part of Marshall’s Hypotheses 
HYPOTHESES
STUDY H1 H2 H3 
Sarat and Vidmar (1976) Y Y Y 
Lord, Ross and Lepper (1979) Y Y N 
Vidmar and Dittenhoffer (1981) Y Y N 
Ellsworth and Ross (1983) Y Y N 
Bohm (1989) Y Y N 
Bohm (1990) Y Y N 
Bohm et al. (1990) Y Y N 
Bohm et al. (1991) Y Y Y 
Bohm and Vogel (1991) Y Y N 
Bohm et al. (1993) Y Y N 
Sandys (1995) Y Y N 
Wright, Bohm and Jamieson (1995) Y Y N 
Bohm and Vogel (2004) Y Y Y 
Clarke, Lambert and Whitt (2000-2001) Y Y N 
Lambert and Clarke (2001) Y Y N 
Cochran and Chamlin (2005) Y Y Y 
Cochran, Sanders and Chamlin (2006) Y Y Y 
Note: Y= yes; N= no. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Results of Previous Studies 
Hypothesis I: The American people are largely ignorant about the administration of capital 
punishment 
At the outset, it is important to note, as Bohm (2003, p. 260) has, that “[w]hat Marshall 
fails to stipulate is how much information a citizen must know in order to be informed.” Bohm 
(2003, p. 260) asks, “Must one know all of it or will 50 to 60 percent suffice?” “Without setting a 
standard,” Bohm asserts, “Marshall leaves unanswered the key question of what it means to be 
informed or knowledgeable about the death penalty” (p.260). In the first test of the Marshall 
hypotheses, Sarat and Vidmar (1976) found that, in response to six death penalty-related items, a 
mean of 46 percent was answered correctly. The authors concluded, “few persons in our sample 
could be labeled ‘informed’ about the death penalty” (p.171), and further, “subjects knew little 
about the death penalty, particularly its effectiveness” (p.195).  
Ellsworth and Ross (1983) also found their subjects ignorant about the death penalty. 
They used nine death penalty-related items to test their subjects’ knowledge. There was only one 
item of the nine that more than 50 percent answered correctly. They concluded, “Our findings of 
high levels of ignorance, often willingly admitted, are consistent with the findings of Sarat and 
Vidmar [1976]” (p.144).  
Bohm, Clark and Aveni (1990) found that their experimental-group subjects initially 
answered correctly only 50 percent of 14 knowledge items, while comparison-group subjects 
answered correctly only 39 percent of the knowledge items. Using a different sample, Bohm, 
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Clark and Aveni (1991) found that their subjects initially answered correctly, on average, only 52 
percent of 14 knowledge items. Whether these results represent being knowledgeable, the 
authors write, “[W]e choose to regard such a score [52%, 50%, or 39%] as indicative of being 
relatively uninformed” (p.369).  
Wright, Bohm and Jamieson (1995) used 17 knowledge items to measure death penalty 
knowledge. Their subjects answered correctly an average of only 47 percent of the items. They 
found that, with two exceptions, “no…knowledge item was answered correctly by more than 
61.4% of all subjects, and only seven of the 17 knowledge items were correctly answered by 
more than half the subjects” (p.64). The exceptions were that 78 percent of their subjects 
correctly knew or guessed that “poor people who commit murder are more likely than rich 
people to be sentenced to death,” and 71 percent of their subjects correctly knew or guessed that 
“for the same crime, men have been more likely to be executed than women” (p.64). Wright et 
al. concluded that the “students had some knowledge about the death penalty, but they cannot be 
considered well informed” (p.64).  
Cochran, Sanders and Chamlin (2006) only report the amount of knowledge gained as a 
result of participating in a death penalty class. They measured knowledge on a pretest at the 
beginning of the class and on a posttest at the end of the class. They report, “The average 
difference in these scores was a 45.4 percentage point improvement . . . . The percent of change 
in knowledge gain was also substantial (203%). That is, on average these students doubled their 
time 1 score on the final exam. In terms of their relative knowledge gains, the students, on 
average, improved their time 1 scores by 71% of what they maximally could have at time 2” (p. 
213). These findings indicate that Cochran et al.’s subjects initially were not well informed about 
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the death penalty (also see Cochran and Chamlin, 2005). Other studies of the Marshall 
hypotheses did not test hypothesis one. 
In sum, seven studies directly tested Marshall’s first hypothesis. These analyses led 
Bohm et al. (1991, p. 361) to claim, “A majority of Americans have taken a very strong position 
on an issue about which they are substantially uninformed.” It appears that Marshall’s first 
hypothesis is supported by the available data. 
Hypothesis II: An informed American public would not support the death penalty 
The literature review revealed two studies that strongly supported Marshall’s second 
hypothesis, nine studies that provided some support, and six studies that seem to suggest that 
Marshall was wrong. 
Studies that Strongly Support Marshall’s Second Hypothesis 
Vidmar and Dittenhoffer (1981) and Sandys (1995) found a strong inverse relationship 
between knowledge about the death penalty and support for it, confirming Marshall’s contention. 
In Vidmar and Dittenhoffer’s 1981 study, support of the death penalty decreased from 48 percent 
to 24 percent, opposition increased from 33 percent to 71 percent, and undecideds decreased 
from 19 percent to 5 percent, when subjects became more knowledgeable about capital 
punishment. Sandys’ 1995 study found that support of the death penalty decreased from 56 
percent to 22 percent, opposition increased from 35 percent to 65 percent, and undecideds 
increased from 9 percent to 13 percent, again as subjects’ capital punishment knowledge 
increased. The Vidmar and Dittenhoffer (1981) and Sandys (1995) studies are unique in the 
literature because they are the only studies to find a majority of subjects opposed to the death 
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penalty after exposure to knowledge about it. A problem with both studies, however, is that they 
were based on extremely small samples: Vidmar and Dittenhoffer (1981) had 21 experimental 
group subjects, and Sandys (1995) had 23 experimental group subjects. Other problems with 
these studies are addressed later.  
Studies that Provide Some Support for Marshall’s Second Hypothesis 
Sarat and Vidmar (1976), Bohm (1989), Bohm, Clark and Aveni (1991), Bohm and 
Vogel (1991), Wright, Bohm and Jamieson (1995), Clarke, Lambert and Whitt (2000-2001), 
Lambert and Clarke (2001), Cochran and Chamlin (2005), and Cochran, Sanders and Chamlin 
(2006) all found some degree of support for the second hypothesis, but none of them reported a 
majority of subjects opposed to the death penalty after becoming informed about it. However, in 
a few studies a majority of some subgroups were opposed to the death penalty after becoming 
more informed. Sarat and Vidmar (1976) found that after exposure to knowledge about the death 
penalty support declined by 20 percentage points (from 62% to 42%), opposition increased by 11 
percentage points (from 27% to 38%), and undecideds increased by 11 percentage points (from 
10% to 21%).     
Following exposure to knowledge, Bohm (1989) discovered that death penalty support 
fell 26 percentage points (from 82% to 56%), opposition increased 24 percentage points (from 
18% to 42%), and undecideds increased by 2 percentage points (from 0% to 2%). The racial 
change was an interesting factor. While white support decreased from 88 percent to 72 percent 
and opposition increased from 12 percent to 29 percent, black support decreased from 72 percent 
to 28 percent and opposition increased from 28 percent to 67 percent (undecideds are not 
reported). Two other interesting findings of this study were that females were the group most 
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resistant to change (support decreased from 74% to 65% and opposition increased from 26% to 
35%), and no female was ever undecided. 
Bohm et al. (1991) employed four measures of death penalty opinion: 1) death penalty 
for some people convicted of first-degree murder, 2) death penalty for all people convicted of 
first degree murder, 3) whether one could convict if served on a capital jury, and 4) whether one 
could pull the lever to instigate an execution. After becoming more informed about the death 
penalty subjects opposed to the death penalty for some persons increased from 28.0 percent to 
49.5 percent, subjects opposed to the death penalty for all persons increased from 28.3 percent to 
46.6 percent, persons who could not convict increased from 5.4 percent to 21.5 percent and 
persons who could not pull the lever increased from 37.6 percent to 40.9 percent. The last change 
was the only one not statistically significant at p < 0.05. Bohm et al. (1991) did not report 
changes in support of the death penalty or changes in undecideds.   
Bohm and Vogel (1991) saw death penalty support decrease from 85.5 percent to 57 
percent, opposition increase from 11.5 percent to 33 percent, and undecideds increased from 3 
percent to 10 percent, after exposure to death penalty knowledge. Similarly, Wright et al. (1995) 
found a decrease in support and an increase in opposition after becoming more informed about 
the death penalty. Support declined from 79 percent to 56 percent and opposition increased from 
13 percent to 36 percent. Those with no opinion remained constant at 8 percent. 
Clarke et al. (2000-2001) also found some change in death penalty opinion after subjects 
became more informed about the penalty. Death penalty support decreased from 60 percent to 55 
percent, death penalty opposition increased from 28 percent to 32 percent, and the percentage of 
those who declared themselves to be “uncertain” moved from 12 percent to 13 percent. The 
authors concluded, “The reduction in support for the death penalty…was not the major reduction 
 12
originally postulated by Justice Marshall when he wrote in Furman that persons who ‘were fully 
informed as to the purposes of the penalty and its liabilities would find the penalty shocking, 
unjust and unacceptable’” (Clarke et al., 2000-2001, p.337, fn.127). In another study, Lambert 
and Clarke (2001) specifically addressed whether knowledge of deterrence and knowledge of 
innocence affected death penalty opinions. They found that knowledge about deterrence did not 
change the death penalty opinions of 55.6 percent of their subjects but changed somewhat the 
death penalty opinions of 43.6 percent of their subjects and changed a great deal the death 
penalty opinions of 0.8 percent of their subjects. Similarly, knowledge about innocence did not 
change the death penalty opinions of 55.6 percent of their subjects but changed somewhat the 
death penalty opinions of 34.7 percent of their subjects and changed a great deal the death 
penalty opinions of 9.8 percent of their subjects.  
 Cochran and Chamlin (2005) and Cochran et al. (2006) showed identical results. (The 
2006 sample included the 2005 sample.) After exposure to death penalty knowledge, death 
penalty support decreased by 14 percentage points (from 64% to 50%), opposition increased by 
27 percentage points (from 19% to 46%), and undecideds decreased by 13 percentage points 
(from 17% to 4%). However, they also found that one-third of their subjects did not change their 
death penalty opinions, and 13 percent of their subjects increased their level of death penalty 
support after learning about the death penalty (Cochran et al., 2006). Though some may take 
issue, the researchers concluded, “[I]mparting knowledge about the death penalty does not work 
as well as Justice Marshall argued” (Cochran et al., 2006, p. 214). 
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Studies that Do Not Support Marshall’s Second Hypothesis 
Six studies failed to support Marshall’s second hypothesis: Lord, Ross, and Lepper 
(1979), Ellsworth and Ross (1983), Bohm, (1990), Bohm et al. (1990), Bohm, Vogel, and Maisto 
(1993), and Bohm and Vogel (2004). Contrary to Marshall’s second hypothesis, Lord et al. 
(1979) did not find that death penalty knowledge reduced death penalty support; rather 
knowledge about the death penalty strengthened previously held death penalty opinions. Lord et 
al. explained, “The net effect of exposing proponents and opponents of capital punishment to 
identical evidence…was to increase further the gap between their views”—to “polarize” their 
views (p. 2105). They noted, “Data relevant to a belief are not processed impartially” (p. 2099) 
but, instead, are assimilated in a biased manner. They concluded: 
Judgments about the validity, reliability, relevance, and sometimes even the meaning of 
proffered evidence are biased by the apparent consistency of that evidence with the 
perceiver’s theories and expectations. Thus individuals will dismiss and discount 
empirical evidence that contradicts their initial views and will derive support from 
evidence, of no greater probativeness, that seem consistent with their views.  
(Lord et al., 1979, p. 2099)  
 
Ellsworth and Ross (1983) and Bohm et al. (1990) likewise reported that “biased 
assimilation” and “attitude polarization” could account for the results in their studies. (In this 
thesis, the concepts attitude and opinion are used interchangeably). Ellsworth and Ross (1983) 
claimed, “The picture that emerges is one of an emotionally based attitude, tempered by a sense 
of social desirability” (p. 152). Bohm et al. (1990) surmised, “Thus reasons provided for death 
penalty opinions appear to be primarily rationalizations or justifications for emotionally based 
opinions, and we ought not to expect them to be particularly responsive to reasoned persuasion” 
(p. 184). 
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Bohm (1990) also failed to find support for Marshall’s second hypothesis. In this study 
Bohm asked subjects to publicly announce their death penalty positions at the beginning of each 
death penalty class (more about the death penalty class later). He discovered that at the end of the 
semester (after exposure to information about the death penalty) death penalty support decreased 
only 5 percentage points (from 62% to 57%), and death penalty opposition increased only 5 
percentage points (from 31% to 36%). By contrast, death penalty support among comparison 
group subjects decreased by 12 percentage points (from 67% to 55%), and death penalty 
opposition among comparison group subjects increased by 14 percentage points (from 22% to 
36%). Thus, there was more change among comparison group subjects, who did not receive 
death penalty information, than there was among subjects who received a semester’s worth of 
death penalty information. Bohm (1990) surmised that having to publicly commit to a death 
penalty position inhibited either death penalty opinion change or the voicing of death penalty 
opinion change. 
 Finally, Bohm et al. (1993) and Bohm and Vogel (2004) conducted panel studies two-to- 
three years and more than ten years, respectively, after subjects completed a semester-long death 
penalty class. Both these studies showed that subjects’ support for the death penalty decreased 
between the beginning of the death penalty class and its end. However, follow-up data revealed a 
“rebound” in death penalty support. That is, after two-to-three years or more than ten years later, 
subjects’ level of death penalty support had returned to, or exceeded, their initial level of death 
penalty support. The researchers concluded that “classroom knowledge” may not prove 
especially effective in changing death penalty opinions in the long term. Nevertheless, as Bohm 
and Vogel (2004, p. 325) cautioned: 
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This does not mean that death penalty opinions are intransigent. Opinions do change, as 
evidenced by the more than sixty-five year history of public opinion polls on the death 
penalty in the United States. This study only indicated that, under one condition [a 
semester-long death penalty class], most death penalty opinions (and reasons for 
opinions) might be impervious to long-term change. If Justice Marshall had in mind a 
stimulus like the one employed in this study, then his belief that death penalty opinions 
could be changed substantially might be wrong. 
Hypothesis III: If the primary reason people support capital punishment is based on the principle 
of retribution, then increased knowledge about the subject would make little or no difference to 
their death penalty opinions 
Only five of the studies tested Marshall’s third hypothesis. Of those that did, all but one 
(Cochran and Chamlin, 2005) found at least some support for it (Sarat and Vidmar, 1976, Bohm 
et al., 1991, Bohm and Vogel, 2004, Cochran et al., 2006). 
Summarizing their findings, Sarat and Vidmar (1976, p. 194) wrote: 
retributiveness is more important in differentiating among supporters and opponents of 
capital punishment than is any of the kinds of information contained in the three 
experimental conditions…retributive motives are highly correlated with the extent of 
change in death penalty support…persons low in retribution, persons whose level of 
support for the death penalty was initially quite low…showed a further alteration in their 
positions…[t]he effect of information among respondents scoring high on the measure of 
retribution was…uniformly minimal…[t]he broad pattern of results thus appears to 
confirm Marshall’s suspicion  that even an informed public opinion might not reject the 
death penalty to the extent that initial support for it is grounded in a desire for vengeance 
and retribution against those who commit capital crimes. 
 
Bohm et al. (1991) found that those who were highly retributivist did not change their 
initial death penalty support very much (from 81.8% to 80%), whereas those who were less 
retributivist did change their opinions to a greater extent (23.3% in support to 6.7% in support).  
In Bohm and Vogel’s (2004) panel study, the effect of retribution and knowledge on 
death penalty opinions were ascertained at four points in time. As Marshall predicted, subjects 
who agreed with the statement, “Society has a right to get revenge when a very serious crime like 
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murder has been committed,” changed their death penalty opinions little over time. However, 
subjects who disagreed with the statement also did not change their death penalty opinions very 
much over time. What Bohm and Vogel (2004) found surprising was that death penalty 
knowledge had little effect on death penalty opinions regardless of subjects’ belief about 
retribution.  
Likewise, Cochran et al. (2006) reported, “Those students who maintained their level of 
death penalty support between time 1 and time 2 were also the most retributive; similarly those 
who maintained their time 1 level of opposition to capital punishment were the least retributive” 
(p. 223). Thus, these findings not only support Marshall’s third hypothesis about highly 
retributive subjects, but they also show that death penalty opponents who are not retributivists 
are unlikely to change their death penalty opinions after becoming more knowledgeable about 
the subject either.   
The one study that did not provide support for Marshall’s third hypothesis was Cochran 
and Chamlin (2005). They observed that “gains in knowledge, when objectively assessed, did 
significantly decrease support for capital punishment among those who espoused retribution” (p. 
580).  
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Critique of Previous Studies 
Sampling 
Experimental / Quasi-Experimental Design 
 Of all the studies that tested the Marshall hypotheses, only Sarat and Vidmar (1976) used 
a true experimental design. Sarat and Vidmar randomly selected a final sample of 181 subjects 
from Amherst, Massachusetts and randomly assigned them to experimental and control groups.  
All of the other studies are quasi-experimental, because they either do not employ random 
selection and assignment of subjects to experimental and comparison groups or do not use 
comparison groups at all.  
Geographical and Temporal Aspects 
Sarat and Vidmar (1976), Lord et al. (1979), Vidmar and Dittenhoffer (1981), and 
Ellsworth and Ross (1983) all used data gathered at a time, or in a place where there were no 
executions being carried out, so in a sense the death penalty was an abstract concept. Data in 
Sarat and Vidmar’s study were collected in Amherst, Massachusetts in 1975. There had not been 
an execution in the United States since 1968. Although Massachusetts did not abolish its death 
penalty until 1984, it had not executed anyone since 1947 (Bedau, 1997). In addition, 
Massachusetts is considered an especially liberal area of the United States and therefore it 
probably is not representative of the United States as a whole (The Bay Area Center for Voting 
Research, nd).  
Lord et al. (1979) did not report when their data were collected from Stanford University 
students in California. However, by 1979, the publication year of their research, there could not 
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have been more than three executions nationwide in more than a decade. The last execution in 
California was in 1967. Also, although Stanford University draws its students from all over the 
United States and the world, it is not clear how geographically representative a sample of 
Stanford University students is.  
Vidmar and Dittenhoffer (1981) collected their data in Canada; they did not indicate 
when their data were collected. Canada abolished its death penalty in 1976 and had not executed 
anyone since 1962 (Bedau, 1997). Therefore their findings may not be particularly relevant to the 
United States  
Ellsworth and Ross (1983) collected their data in the San Francisco Bay area during the 
summer and fall of 1974. Like the data in the Sarat and Vidmar (1976) study, the data in the 
Ellsworth and Ross (1983) study were collected in a liberal area of the country (The Bay Area 
Center for Voting Research, nd) at a time when executions were not being conducted. However, 
unlike the Sarat and Vidmar (1976) study, Ellsworth and Ross took pains to reduce any liberal 
bias in their sample. Specifically, they used “a stratified random sampling procedure based on 
the precinct voting records of… [four] towns in the 1972 California referendum on the 
restoration of capital punishment” (p. 123). Two of the towns tended to support capital 
punishment in the 1972 referendum, and the two other towns tended to oppose capital 
punishment in the same referendum. To obtain an even more representative sample, each town 
was divided into five groups, “according to the degree of support for capital punishment they had 
shown in 1972” (p. 123). From each group, within each town, 25 households were randomly 
sampled.  
All the remaining studies collected data from students at universities in the United States 
at a time when the death penalty was a salient issue, that is, when people were being executed. 
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Bohm (1989), Bohm (1990), Bohm et al. (1990), Bohm et al. (1991), Bohm and Vogel (1991), 
Bohm et al. (1993), and Bohm and Vogel (2004) collected their data from students in Alabama. 
Wright et al. (1995) collected their data from students in North Carolina. Data for Sandys (1995) 
study were obtained from Indiana students. Clarke et al.’s (2000-2001) data came from an 
unidentified university in the Midwest. Lambert and Clarke’s (2001) data were from Michigan.  
Cochran and Chamlin (2005) and Cochran et al. (2006) obtained their data in Florida.  
Sample Size and Composition 
 Sample sizes varied greatly. On the low end, Vidmar and Dittenhoffer (1981) had 21 
subjects in an experimental group and 18 subjects in a comparison group. In this study 67 
percent were female and only 33 percent were male. No other demographic data were given 
other than the subjects were English Canadian. It does not appear that Vidmar and Dittenhoffer’s 
sample was representative of the Canadian population. Sandys (1995) had 23 experimental group 
subjects and no comparison group. Seventy-four percent of Sandys’ (1995) sample was male and 
91 percent of her sample was white, hardly representative of the general  population of the 
United States. As mentioned previously, these were the only two studies that found a majority of 
subjects opposed to the death penalty after becoming more informed about it and, thus, the only 
studies that strongly supported Marshall’s second hypothesis.  
On the high end, Lambert and Clarke (2001) had 488 experimental group subjects and 
242 comparison group subjects for a total of 730 subjects. Ellsworth and Ross (1983) report 500 
experimental group subjects but no comparison group. Table 2 provides sample sizes for all of 




Sample Sizes of Previous Tests of the Marshall Hypotheses 
STUDY  E C TOTAL
Sarat and Vidmar (1976) 181 45 181 
Lord, Ross and Lepper (1979) 48 No 48 
Vidmar and Dittenhoffer (1981) 21 18 39 
Ellsworth and Ross (1983) 500 No 500 
Bohm (1989) 50 No 50 
Bohm (1990) 59 54 109 
Bohm et al. (1990) 44 27 71 
Bohm et al. (1991) 190 82 272 
Bohm and Vogel (1991) 70 35 105 
Bohm et al. (1993) 106 No 106 
Bohm and Vogel (2004) 69 No 69 
Wright, Bohm and Jamieson (1995) 38 68 106 
Sandys (1995) 23 No 23 
Clarke, Lambert and Whitt (2000-2001) 110 dropped and 107 retained 103 324* 
Lambert and Clarke (2001) 488 242 730 
Cochran and Chamlin (2005) 70 No 70 
Cochran, Sanders and Chamlin (2006) 365 No 365 
 




 As noted in the previous section, all but two of the studies used student subjects. 
Although student subjects are rarely representative of the general population, they were 
employed in these studies because it was one of the only ways to expose subjects to the 
experimental stimulus (death penalty knowledge) over an extended period of time. Brevity of 
exposure to the experimental stimulus was a weakness of earlier studies (e.g., Sarat and Vidmar, 
1976).    
Comparison Groups 
 Only nine of the seventeen studies employed comparison groups. Thus, in those studies 
without comparison groups it is not possible to determine if any changes in death penalty 
opinions are a function of the experimental stimulus or some other factor or factors. Table 2 
shows the studies that utilized comparison groups and those that did not.  
Experimental Stimuli 
The first few tests of the Marshall hypotheses used questionable experimental stimuli. 
For example, after conducting an initial survey, Sarat and Vidmar (1976) administered their 
experimental stimulus. This was in the form of two different 1,500 word essays. One of the 
essays consisted of statistical studies, personal experiences, deterrence psychology, and 
recidivism data for homicide offenders. They dubbed this the utilitarian essay. The second essay-
the humanitarian essay--dealt with the physical and psychological aspects of executions. The 
sample was then split into four groups. These groups received either essays one and two, essay 
one only, or essay two only. The fourth group—the control group—received an essay on 
unrelated legal matters with no death penalty ramifications. After reading these essays the 
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subjects were requested to complete a section of the original survey which examined the 
“application and effects” of the death penalty. Sarat and Vidmar warned of their study’s 
limitations, stating that due to the limited manner of informing the subjects and the lack of time 
given for reflection and discussion, their findings should be interpreted cautiously.  
In Lord et al. (1979) subjects read two cards containing synopses of death penalty 
deterrence study results: one containing pro-deterrent information and the other containing anti-
deterrent information. The subjects were then asked if they had changed their belief in the 
deterrent effect of capital punishment. Subjects were then given methodological analyses of the 
studies and asked whether or not they found the studies convincing. Then the subjects were 
asked about their capital punishment views concerning its deterrent effect. A problem with the 
experimental stimulus was that it was narrowly focused only on the death penalty’s deterrent 
effect and did not address all of the other information a person would need to know to be 
considered informed about the death penalty. Another problem, common to these early studies, 
was that there was little time for subjects to reflect upon the information they had been given.   
 In the Vidmar and Dittenhoffer (1981) study, the stimulus was 8 papers and a 
3,500 word essay about the death penalty, with the option of reading two books by respected 
death penalty scholars. This was followed by a discussion period, which took place two weeks 
after the stimulus. The discussion groups consisted of three to four individuals each and were 
designed to improve the validity of the Sarat and Vidmar study of 1976 in which there was no 
discussion period. However, despite this improvement, Vidmar and Dittenhoffer’s study did have 
methodological problems with the experimental stimulus. First, there was no guarantee that 
subjects read the required material. Second, no attempt was made to measure the amount of 
information subjects understood and internalized. Third, with regard to the discussion groups, 
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there were no checks made to see if subjects were even discussing the death penalty and their 
readings. Fourth, a one hour discussion may not have been long enough to achieve the desired 
goal.    
Ellsworth and Ross (1983) did not use an experimental stimulus. They only gathered 
information about their subjects’ death penalty opinions at one point in time.  
In a design similar to the earlier studies, Clarke et al. (2000-2001) and Lambert and 
Clarke (2001) used three essays as the experimental stimulus. The first essay was a comparison 
essay which dealt with the philosophical nature of punishment but did not discuss the death 
penalty itself. The second essay discussed empirical evidence about the death penalty and its 
deterrent effect. It showed that studies did not support a deterrent effect for capital punishment. 
The third essay focused on the “frequency and probability of sentencing innocent people to 
death” (p.328). These essays were distributed randomly to students who were enrolled in 
criminal justice and general education classes. It does not appear that either study used a death 
penalty class as a stimulus.  
 The experimental stimulus in the remaining studies was a semester-long death penalty 
class because, as Bohm (1990) has stated, “Brevity of exposure to the experimental stimulus is a 
weakness of previous research” (p.287). The classes consisted of lectures, guest speakers, videos, 
and assigned readings and were comprehensive examinations of capital punishment in the United 
States. Although a semester-long class on the death penalty is a far better method for delivering 
information than reading a few essays or a couple of books, a death penalty class is not the only 
source of information about the death penalty. Witnessing an execution and talking to co-
victims, for example, would be other ways of becoming more knowledgeable about the death 
penalty.  
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A problem with using a classroom experience for informing people about the death 
penalty is the influence of the instructor—the “experimenter effect.” A charismatic or obnoxious 
instructor, for example, could have an extraordinary influence on students beyond the class 
material. In the Bohm and Cochran studies, the class instructor was forthcoming about his 
abolitionist viewpoint but played advocatus diaboli to whatever position a student took. Both 
researchers made it clear that students’ death penalty opinions would have no bearing on their 
final grades. Other researchers either did not reveal their death penalty positions or, if they did, 
did not report them in their studies. Bohm (1989) has suggested that having a proponent of the 
death penalty teaching the class may produce different results.  
Measures of Death Penalty Opinion 
 Many studies have found that the wording of questions and response categories used to 
ascertain subjects’ death penalty opinions can make a great deal of difference to their response. 
Williams, Longmire and Gulick (1988), for example, found that as questions become less 
abstract and more concrete the level of reported support significantly decreases. They also found 
that the public seemed to be surer about their general support for the death penalty than under 
what specific circumstances to use it.  
Sarat and Vidmar (1976) and Lord et al. (1979) tested opinion before and after the 
experimental stimuli, as did a majority of the other studies. Sarat and Vidmar (1976) used a 
seven-point Likert scale (“very strongly agree,” “strongly agree,” “somewhat agree,” 
“uncertain,” “somewhat disagree,” “strongly disagree,” and “very strongly disagree”) to measure 
death penalty opinion, but they did not report the question that was asked of their subjects. Also, 
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Lord et al. (1979) did not report how they nominally or operationally defined death penalty 
opinion. The subjects, after administration of the experimental stimulus, were asked to simply 
note their change in death penalty opinion on a sixteen-point scale.  
 Ellsworth and Ross’s (1983) survey measured death penalty opinion in a much more 
thorough way than many of the other studies. The researchers asked one general death penalty 
attitude question, “Do you believe in capital punishment or are you opposed to it?” (p. 126). 
Response categories were “believed in,” “opposed,” and “undecided.” Questions were also asked 
regarding mandatory or discretionary death penalty sentences for a range of scenarios and, 
finally, questions were asked about the subjects’ predicted behavior if they were ever to be on a 
capital jury. This question specifically dealt with the level of evidence they would require in 
order to convict.  In this study, the questionnaire was administered only once. 
 Bohm (1989), Bohm (1990), Bohm et al. (1990), Bohm et al. (1991), Bohm and Vogel 
(1991), Wright et al. (1995), Bohm et al. (1993), and Bohm and Vogel (2004) used a seven-point 
Likert scale on their surveys to gauge opinion. In Bohm (1989) and Bohm (1990), the survey was 
administered after each class. In this way Bohm could ascertain the nature and degree of change 
generated by each specific stimulus (class topic), allowing him to further discern what stimuli 
had what effect. In these studies, the researcher asked the abstract question about death penalty 
support for some people convicted of first-degree murder. Bohm and Vogel (1991) asked four 
questions regarding death penalty opinion, measured using a seven-point Likert scale. However, 
they only reported the results of one abstract question: “Which of the following statements best 
describes your position toward the death penalty for some people convicted of first-degree 
murder?” (p. 72).   
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Bohm et al. (1990) adopted and reported a more robust method of measuring death 
penalty opinion in their sample. Their goal was to explain the reasons for death penalty support 
and opposition. They asked their subjects’ death penalty opinion with respect to general 
deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, administrative considerations, religious reasons and 
support for law enforcement. All the responses were recorded and reported on a five-point Likert 
scale (“strongly agree,” “agree,” “uncertain,” “disagree,” and “strongly disagree”). 
Bohm et al. (1991) also used a more solid approach. The researchers were aware of the 
potential problems Williams et al. (1988) had highlighted with death penalty opinion 
measurement. Bohm et al. (1991), Bohm et al. (1993), and Bohm and Vogel (2004) used four 
questions to measure death penalty opinion in the abstract and concrete. These questions were: 
1. Which of the following best describes your position toward the death penalty for all 
persons convicted of first degree murder? 
2. Which of the following best describes your position toward the death penalty for some 
persons convicted of first degree murder? 
3. If you served on a jury where the defendant, if found guilty, would automatically be 
sentenced to death, could you convict the defendant? 
4. If asked to do it, could you pull the lever that would result in the death of an individual 
convicted of first-degree murder? (Bohm et al. 1991, p. 368) 
Responses were recorded on a seven-point Likert scale. 
Wright et al. (1995) used the same four abstract and concrete questions that Bohm et al. 
used in 1991. In addition, they asked two questions regarding alternatives to capital punishment, 
again paying heed to Williams et al. (1988). The two additional questions were: 
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1. Would you support an alternative to the death penalty where a convicted first-
degree murderer is sentenced to life in prison, with no possibility of parole ever 
(LWOP)? 
2. Would you support an alternative to the death penalty where a convicted first-
degree murderer is sentenced to life in prison, with no possibility of parole ever 
and have him/her work in a prison industry where his/her earnings would go to 
the victim’s family? 
The subjects answered using a five-point Likert scale.   
Sandys (1995) measured opinion over the course of the semester. She asked the same 
question before every class, “What is your attitude toward the death penalty for some people 
convicted of first degree murder?” (p. 43, fn. 3). This is clearly an abstract question (with no 
other question types) and therefore vulnerable to the dangers highlighted by Williams et al. 
(1988). The subjects answered using a seven-point Likert scale. Sandys (1995) then followed up 
to gauge opinion a year later using the same question.   
 Clarke et al. (2000-2001) and Lambert and Clarke (2001) used a five-point Likert scale to 
measure death penalty opinion. However, they do not report the specific death penalty questions 
they asked. 
 Cochran and Chamlin (2005) and Cochran et al. (2006) used two death penalty opinion 
questions. They asked their subjects about the death penalty for “all people convicted of first-
degree murder” (p. 576-77), and if they would choose “life in prison, without any possibility of 
parole” (p. 577) as an alternative to the death penalty. As noted previously, a problem with these 
questions is that both are abstract. They used a seven-point Likert scale to measure responses. 
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Measures of Death Penalty Knowledge 
 In the aforementioned studies, death penalty knowledge was measured in one of three 
ways. Most studies used a pretest-posttest design, with identical questionnaires administered 
before and after exposure to an experimental stimulus. A section of each questionnaire contained 
a knowledge index consisting of various numbers of factual items about the death penalty. A few 
studies simply assumed that subjects were more knowledgeable about the death penalty 
following completion of a death penalty class than they were prior to it. Finally, the two follow-
up studies asked subjects to self report how much death penalty knowledge they had gained 
along a continuum, ranging from zero (“know absolutely nothing”) to nine (“extremely 
knowledgeable”).  
 Studies that employed a knowledge index with a pretest-posttest design were conducted 
by Sarat and Vidmar (1976), Vidmar and Dittenhoffer (1981), Bohm et al. (1990), Bohm et al. 
(1991), Wright et al. (1995), Cochran and Chamlin (2005), and Cochran et al. (2006). Sarat and 
Vidmar (1976, p. 175) used six knowledge items:  
1. Are there any people currently awaiting execution in the United States? 
2. How many people were executed in the five years prior to the Furman decision? 
3. Poor people who commit murder are more likely to be sentenced to death than rich 
people who commit a similar crime. 
4. The punishment of death has typically been imposed in only a small fraction of the cases 
where it is an authorized punishment. 
5. Most scientific studies of the effects of the death penalty show that it is an effective 
deterrent to crime, do not show that it is an effective deterrent to crime, don’t know. 
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6. Studies have shown that the rate of murder usually drops in the weeks following a well 
publicized execution. 
Vidmar and Dittenhoffer (1981) used ten knowledge items, but did not provide them in 
their published article (they were “available from the authors, upon request”).  
Bohm et al. (1990) and Bohm et al. (1991) used fourteen items to measure death penalty 
knowledge:  
1. The death penalty has been abolished by a majority of Western European nations. 
2. Over the years states which had the death penalty have shown lower murder rates than 
neighboring states which did not have the death penalty. 
3. Studies have not found that abolishing the death penalty has any significant effect on the 
murder rate in a state. 
4. Studies have shown that the rate of murder usually drops in the weeks following a well 
publicized execution. (Sarat and Vidmar Q. 6)  
5. The average prison term served by someone sentenced to life imprisonment is less than 
ten years. 
6. Poor people who commit murder are more likely to be sentenced to death than rich 
people who commit a similar crime. (Sarat and Vidmar Q. 3) 
7. After the Supreme Court struck down the death penalty in 1972, the murder rate in the 
U.S. showed a sharp upturn. 
8. On the average, the death penalty costs the taxpayer less than life imprisonment. 
9. Currently, there are over one thousand people awaiting execution. 
10. The punishment of death has typically been imposed in only a small fraction of the cases 
where it is an authorized punishment. (Sarat and Vidmar Q. 4) 
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11. The majority of the executions in the United States take place in the South. 
12. For the same crime men are more likely to be executed than women. 
13. Currently, the leadership of organized religion in the United States (whether Catholic, 
Jewish or Protestant) has abandoned its traditional support of (or silence on) the death 
penalty and instead favors its complete abolition. 
14. The majority of Americans currently favor the death penalty.  
Wright et al. (1995) employed seventeen knowledge items. Twelve of the knowledge 
items came from Bohm et al. (1990) and Bohm et al. (1991), and five of the items were new. The 
twelve items from Bohm et al. were numbers 1, 2, 4-12, and 14, and the new items were: 
1. Most of the states in the U.S. do not have capital punishment laws. 
2. A black person is more likely to receive the death penalty than a white person for the 
same crime. 
3. Lethal injection is the most commonly used method of execution today. 
4. No innocent people have been executed in error in the U.S. this century. 
5. The killers of black people are just as likely to receive the death penalty as the killers of 
white people. 
Cochran and Chamlin (2005) and Cochran et al. (2006) included four death penalty 
“truth” statements and seven death penalty “myth” statements as a knowledge measure. Only one 
of the “truth” statements was original: “There is strong reason to believe that similar offenders 
convicted of murder often receive dissimilar sentences; that is, some are sentenced to death while 
others are sentenced to an alternative less than death.”  Two of the other “truth” statements were 
the same as in Wright et al. (1995)—numbers nine and 17—and the other one was the same as  
Sarat and Vidmar’s (1976) number three. Three of the “myth” statements were original to the 
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study and four were the same items used in previous studies (numbers five and six in Sarat and 
Vidmar, 1976 and numbers two and eight in Bohm et al., 1990, 1991). The three original 
statements were: 
1. The death penalty is more effective than life imprisonment without possibility of 
parole (LWOP) in protecting society from the future actions of those who have 
already committed capital crimes. 
2. Only legally relevant criteria distinguish murderers sentenced to death from those 
sentenced to a punishment less than death. 
3. There is no evidence to support the claim that innocent persons have ever been 
sentenced to death and executed in error. (Cochran et al., 2006, p. 211-212) 
Ellsworth and Ross (1983) provided subjects with nine knowledge items on a pretest 
only. Questions one through seven and question nine are the same as in Bohm et al. (1990, 
1991). Question 8 is the only different one: “In several cases people executed for murder in the 
U.S. were later proven innocent.” 
Studies that only assumed subjects were more knowledgeable at the end of a death 
penalty class included Lord et al. (1979), Bohm (1989), Bohm (1990), Bohm and Vogel (1991), 
Sandys (1995), Clarke et al. (2000-2001), and Lambert and Clarke (2001). Bohm et al. (1993) 
and Bohm and Vogel (2004) asked subjects to self-report their level of death penalty knowledge 
in their follow-up studies.  
Studies that assumed subjects were more knowledgeable at the end of a death penalty 
class are vulnerable to the criticism that students may not have actually learned much in the 
class, let alone retained any information that they did learn. Also, research shows that many 
subjects may have assimilated information they learned in class biasedly. That is, they may have 
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learned the information that supported their initial death penalty position and ignored the 
information that contradicted it. Another potential problem is that the class instructor may have 
delivered factually inaccurate information during the course of the semester. A problem with 
studies that relied on self-reported knowledge is that subjects may have incorrectly assessed their 
level of death penalty knowledge. Even studies that provided knowledge indices can be criticized 
for assuming the correct answers for all of the questions are noncontroversial. For example, in 
Wright et al. (1995) one of the knowledge items was: “No innocent people have been executed in 
error in the U.S. this [20th] century.” Although many authorities consider this statement false, as 
did Wright et al. (1995), there is no incontrovertible evidence that the statement is false.  
Measures of Retribution 
Only nine of the studies measured retribution, and only five of the studies actually tested 
Marshall’s third hypothesis. All of the studies that measured retribution used one or more items 
and asked subjects to respond on Likert-type scales. The studies that tested Marshall’s third 
hypothesis were Sarat and Vidmar (1976), Bohm et al. (1991), Bohm and Vogel (2004), Cochran 
and Chamlin (2005), and Cochran et al. (2006).  Sarat and Vidmar (1976, p.181, fn. 54) used 
three retribution items: 
1. It is only right that people who hurt others should be hurt themselves. 
2. It is simple justice that criminals should be punished for their crimes. 
3. The only proper justification for punishing criminals is the punishment has a deterrent 
or retributive purpose.  
Bohm et al. (1991, p. 382) used a series of eight items to measure retribution: 
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1. If a murderer is not executed for the crime, the friends and family of the victim are 
likely to take it upon themselves to seek revenge. 
2. The very worst of the Nazi war criminals should have been executed for their “crimes 
against humanity.” 
3. Those who take a life should forfeit their own in return. 
4. Killing is all right if the right people do it and think they have a good reason for doing 
it. 
5. Society has a right to get revenge when a very serious crime like murder has been 
committed. 
6. Sometimes I feel a sense of personal outrage when a convicted murderer was 
sentenced to a penalty less than death. 
7. There are some murderers whose death would give me a sense of personal 
satisfaction. 
8. An execution would make me sad, regardless of the crime the individual committed. 
(Reverse scored) 
Cochran and Chamlin (2005) and Cochran et al. (2006) both used two retribution 
statements taken from Bohm et al. (1991): 
1. Those who take a life should forfeit their own in return. 
2. Society has a right to get revenge when a serious crime like murder has been 
committed. 
Studies by Lord et al. (1979), Sandys (1995), Wright et al. (1995), Clarke et al. (2000-
2001), Bohm and Vogel (1991), and Lambert and Clarke (2001) did not measure retribution and, 
therefore, could not test Marshall’s third hypothesis. 
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A problem with the retribution measures is that the concept of retribution is ambiguous 
(Bohm, 2003). Philosopher John Cottingham (1979) contends there at least nine different 
definitions of retribution. As noted previously, Justice Marshall equated retribution with 
vengeance, but vengeance is only one type of retribution. Another, for example, is “just deserts.” 
Therefore, a problem is whether the measures of retribution employed in the studies cited above 
truly captured Justice Marshall’s conception of retribution. A related problem is that none of the 
retribution items actually contain the word retribution; consequently, it must be inferred that 
subjects interpreted the items as retributive. 
 This thesis is another test of Marshall’s hypotheses. It differs from the previous studies in 
several ways. First, it is one of the only studies that was conducted in a post-9/11 environment. 
Second, it was conducted at a time in United States history when lethal injection, the preferred 
method of execution in the United States, was coming under both greater scrutiny and attack 
from many areas of American society. Various state legislatures and executive branches are 
presently acting in response to this nationwide concern. This is shown by the fact that two states 
(Illinois and New Jersey) have official moratoria in place, five other states (Arkansas, Delaware, 
Maryland, Nebraska, and North Carolina) have ceased executions to either allow further 
investigation into the administration of lethal injection executions or to allow the courts to 
consider Eighth Amendment claims, and California has been enjoined from carrying out lethal 
injection executions by order of a federal court. No test of the Marshall hypotheses has been 
carried out at a time of such flux in capital punishment. 
In addition, this thesis, unlike previous studies, uses 19 items to measure death penalty 
opinion. Three of these items ask about abstract support for the death penalty and 16 items ask 
about support for the death penalty in a number of specific circumstances (e.g., the murder of a 
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child, the murder of a law enforcement officer, rape in the absence of murder). Two of the items 
inquire about support for life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) and life without the 
possibility of parole plus restitution (LWOP +). Research shows that these two measures greatly 
attenuate death penalty support (see, for example, Gallup, 2006). This thesis also uses a larger 
sample than Lord et al. (1979), Vidmar and Dittenhoffer (1981), Sandys (1995), and many of the 
Bohm experiments and employs a comparison group unlike Lord et al. (1979), Ellsworth and 
Ross (1983), Bohm (1989), Sandys (1995), Cochran and Chamlin (2005), and Cochran et al. 
(2006). At the very least, this study, which was conducted under different circumstances than 
previous studies, is another replication of tests of the Marshall hypotheses. As such, it is another 
check on the reliability and validity of previous tests and the veracity of Marshall’s claims. It 
also provides another check on the generalizability of Marshall’s contentions. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
Experimental Design 
This study used a pretest-posttest comparison group design. Subjects of the study were 
undergraduates from a large public university in Florida. One hundred forty-six subjects took the 
pretest (82 in the experimental group and 64 in the comparison group), and 175 subjects 
completed the posttest (95 in the experimental group and 80 in the comparison group). The 
disparity in the number of subjects who took the pretest and posttest is a function of students 
adding the courses after the pretests were administered.  The experimental group was comprised 
of students enrolled in a semester-long death penalty class, and the comparison group consisted 
of students from another criminal justice class. Each course was taught during the fall semester 
of 2006. Subjects in the comparison group had not taken, or were not currently taking, the death 
penalty class. Most of the subjects were criminal justice majors or minors, and many of them had 
been exposed to some material on the death penalty in previous classes. None of the subjects was 
randomly selected or assigned. As noted in the critique of previous studies (e.g., Sarat and 
Vidmar, 1976), student subjects were used to overcome the problem of other studies that only 
briefly exposed subjects to the experimental stimulus. Participation in the study was optional, 
and responses were provided anonymously. 
Table 3 shows demographic characteristics of experimental and comparison groups on 
the pretest and posttest. On the pretest, 53 percent of experimental group subjects were female, 
and 47 percent were male; 10 percent were black, 12 percent were Hispanic, 71 percent were 
white, and 7 percent were Asian or other. On the posttest, 45 percent of experimental group 
 37
subjects were female, and 52 percent were male; 6 percent were black, 10 percent Hispanic, 71 
percent were white, and 13 percent were Asian or other. On the pretest, 45 percent of comparison 
group subjects were female, and 55 percent were male; 14 percent were black, 16 percent were 
Hispanic, 67 percent were white, and 3 percent were Asian or other. On the posttest, 45 percent 
of comparison group subjects were female and 54 percent were male; 13 percent were black, 13 
percent were Hispanic, 71 percent were white, and 3 percent were Asian or other. These data 
show that the experimental and comparison groups were relatively equivalent with regard to 
gender and race or ethnicity.  
Table 3 
Demographic Characteristics of Experimental and Comparison Groups on Pretest and Posttest 
(in percentages) 
                        SEX                                       RACE 
Pretest Male Female White Black Hispanic Asian or Other
Exp 47 53 71 10 12 7 
Comp 55 45 67 14 16 3 
Posttest       
Exp 53 47 71 6 10 13 
Comp 54 46 71 13 13 3 
 
Both classes met twice a week for one and a quarter hours for an entire semester (16 
weeks). The death penalty class text was Deathquest II: An Introduction to the Theory and 
Practice of Capital Punishment in the United States (2003), which was written by the instructor 
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and is known as a balanced assessment of many aspects of capital punishment (Blecker, 2007). 
The course consisted of lectures by the instructor, videos, and discussion. Discussion was 
encouraged at all times by the instructor. The instructor was forthright about his anti-death 
penalty opinions but presented the information in a manner that was as unbiased as possible. The 
instructor played “devil’s advocate” when students asked questions, making sure that both sides 
of the death penalty debate were represented. During the semester many death penalty-related 
topics were covered including its history, Supreme Court death penalty cases, public opinion, 
deterrence, incapacitation, religious arguments, retribution, arbitrariness, and discrimination (see 
Appendix A). This class was the experimental stimulus and, as such, suffers from all of the 
problems with this type of stimulus discussed in the critique of previous studies. However, it did 
allow subjects to thoroughly immerse themselves in death penalty knowledge, to discuss the 
subject, and to reflect upon it over a protracted period of time.  
Measurement Procedures 
Subjects completed the same survey (see Appendix B) on the first and the final days of 
the semester. The survey was designed to obtain three kinds of information. Section one 
contained items that measured subjects’ death penalty opinions. Four of these items asked about 
abstract support for the death penalty; however, only three of the items were used in the analysis, 
and 16 items asked about support for the death penalty in a number of specific circumstances 
(e.g., the murder of a child, the murder of a law enforcement officer, rape in the absence of 
murder). Two of the abstract items—support of the death penalty for all and for some people 
convicted of first-degree murder—have been used in previous research.  The “death penalty for 
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all” item was dropped from the analysis because upon further reflection it was decided that the 
item was no longer relevant since the Court’s decisions in Woodson v. North Carolina (428 U.S. 
280, 1976) and Roberts v. Louisiana (428 U.S. 325, 1976), which made mandatory death penalty 
statutes unconstitutional. The other two abstract items dealt with alternatives to the death 
penalty: 1) support for life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP), and 2) support for 
life in prison without the possibility of parole plus forcing the inmate to work in prison industry 
and give all his/her earnings to the victims’ family or the community (LWOP+). Subjects 
responded on a five-point Likert scale (“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”).  
The first section also contained five items used to measure retribution: 
1. I believe the government has the right to kill in certain circumstances. 
2. The death penalty is “purposeless vengeance” (reverse scored). 
3. I believe the main purpose of the death penalty is retribution/revenge. 
4. Sometimes I have a sense of personal outrage when a convicted murderer is 
sentenced to a penalty less than death. 
5. When I hear about an execution it makes me sad, regardless of the crime the 
individual committed (reverse scored).  
All but the second item had been used in previous studies to create a retribution index 
(see Sarat and Vidmar, 1976; Bohm et al., 1991; Bohm et al., 1993; and Wright et al., 1995). 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of reliability for the retribution index is .77. 
Section two of the survey contained 21 knowledge items with three response categories: 
“true,” “false,” and “don’t know.” The “don’t know” category was scored as an incorrect answer 
and was used to discourage subjects from simply guessing and potentially distorting the results. 
The 21 knowledge items were combined to form an index. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 
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reliability for the knowledge index is .83.  Finally, the third section asked for demographic 
details about the subjects (See Appendix B) 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
The results of the tests for each of Marshall’s hypotheses are presented below.  
Hypothesis I: The American people are largely ignorant about the administration of capital 
punishment 
Results of the study support Marshall’s first hypothesis. On the pretest, the experimental 
group answered 39 percent of the knowledge items correctly, and the comparison group 
answered 33 percent of the knowledge items correctly. Thus, neither group could be considered 
well informed about the death penalty. Looked at somewhat differently, the experimental group 
answered a mean of approximately 8 of 21 knowledge items correctly, while the comparison 
group answered a mean of about 7 of the 21 knowledge items correctly. A two-tailed 
independent t-test showed the difference in knowledge items answered correctly by the 
experimental and comparison groups was statistically significant at p = .009. These results are 
displayed in Table 4. However, because the experimental group, on average, answered only one 
more knowledge item correctly than the comparison group, the difference between the two 
groups is not considered substantively significant. Either way, neither group could be considered 







Comparison of Pretest Percentages and Means of Experimental and Comparison Groups on the 
Knowledge Index 
Group N % Mean SD Std. Error Of Mean 
Comparison 64 32.5 6.8281 3.22960 .40370 
Experimental 82 38.9 8.1707 2.91782 .32222 
 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference
-2.632 144 .009 -1.34261 
Hypothesis II: An informed American public would not support the death penalty 
The first issue addressed in this section is whether the experimental stimulus was 
successful in producing informed subjects. The second issue examined was whether increased 
death penalty knowledge changed subjects’ death penalty opinions (Marshall’s second 
hypothesis). After exposure to the experimental stimulus, the experimental group increased the 
percentage of knowledge items answered correctly about 20 percentage points, from 38.9 percent 
on the pretest to 58.8 percent on the posttest. The comparison group, on the other hand, increased 
the percentage of knowledge items answered correctly only six percentage points from 32.5 
percent on the pretest to 38.5 percent on the posttest. Looked at in terms of knowledge mean 
score differences, the experimental group increased its mean score of knowledge items answered 
correctly from about eight items on the pretest to approximately 12 items on the posttest. This 50 
percent increase in death penalty knowledge for the experimental group was statistically 
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significant at p < .000. As for the comparison group, the mean knowledge score increased from 
about seven items answered correctly to approximately eight items answered correctly. This 14 
percent increase in death penalty knowledge for the comparison group was statistically 
significant at p = .014, but the approximately one point difference in means is not considered 
substantively significant. These data suggest that the experimental group was significantly more 
informed than the comparison group (p< .000) after the experimental group was exposed to the 
experimental stimulus. Yet, as noted previously, the experimental group cannot be considered 
well informed even after exposure to the experimental stimulus. 
Marshall’s second hypothesis was tested using one-tailed independent t-tests. Results 
show that Marshall’s second hypothesis is only partially supported by the data. Increased death 
penalty knowledge, albeit minimally increased knowledge, did not reduce death penalty support 
for some people convicted of first-degree murder (see Table 5) or for any of the 16 concrete 
items (see Table 7). Alternatives to the death penalty, however, fared better. Following exposure 
to the experimental stimulus, support for LWOP and LWOP + increased in the experimental 
group. As shown in Table 8, the mean score on the LWOP measure in the experimental group 
increased from about 3.5 on the pretest to approximately 3.9 on the posttest. The difference was 
statistically significant at p = .007. On the LWOP+ measure, the mean score increased from 
about 3.7 on the pretest to approximately 4.3 on the posttest. This difference was statistically 




Comparison of means: Death penalty support for some people convicted of first-degree murder 
COMP               EXP 
 Pre Post Pre Post 
N 64 80 82 93 
% 44.4 55.5 46.8 53.2 
Mean 3.610 3.300 3.451 3.484
sd 1.341 1.479 1.306 1.508
seM .168 .165 .144 .156 
t 1.300 -.152 
df 142 173 














Table 6  
Experimental Group: Concrete Items 
 Pre Mean Post Mean t df Sig. (1-tail) 
I support the death penalty for the 
adult murderers of children. 
4.171 4.258 -.480 173 .316 
I support the death penalty for 
murderers of law enforcement 
officers. 
3.817 3.979 -.866 173 .194 
I support the death penalty for 
murderers of correctional officers. 
3.817 4.044 -1.227 172 .111 
I support the death penalty for 
prisoners who murder fellow 
inmates. 
3.210 3.280 -.385 172 .350 
I support the death penalty for 
serial killers. 
4.451 4.413 .213 172 .416 
I support the death penalty for 
those who kill during a rape. 
4.146 4.280 -.719 173 .237 
I support the death penalty for 
those who kill during a robbery. 
3.732 3.742 -.054 173 .479 
I support the death penalty for 
those who kill during a 
kidnapping for ransom. 
3.963 4.141 -.976 171 .166 
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 Pre Mean Post Mean t df Sig. (1-tail) 
I support the death penalty for 
rapists who do not kill their 
victims. 
2.890 2.742 .832 173 .204 
I could pull the lever to initiate an 
execution by lethal gas (gas 
chamber). 
3.110 2.989 .552 173 .291 
I could pull the trigger in a firing 
squad. 
2.939 2.926 .062 174 .476 
I could pull the gallows lever in a 
hanging execution. 
2.744 2.830 -.407 174 .342 
I could flip the switch in an 
execution by electrocution. 
2.976 2.957 .085 173 .466 
I could inject the chemicals in a 
lethal injection execution. 
2.902 2.946 -.199 173 .421 
I could witness an execution. 3.561 3.763 -1.049 173 .148 
If I were a member of a jury in a 
death penalty case, I could 
sentence a defendant to death if 
the evidence supported it.  





Comparison Group Concrete Items 
 Pre Mean Post Mean t df Sig. (1-tail) 
I support the death penalty for the 
adult murderers of children. 
4.422 4.225 1.062 142 .145 
I support the death penalty for 
murderers of law enforcement 
officers. 
3.938 3.963 -.120 142 .453 
I support the death penalty for 
murderers of correctional officers. 
3.828 3.900 -.341 142 .367 
I support the death penalty for 
prisoners who murder fellow 
inmates. 
3.422 3.375 .224 142 .412 
I support the death penalty for 
serial killers. 
4.484 4.375 .606 142 .273 
I support the death penalty for 
those who kill during a rape. 
4.266 4.238 .142 142 .444 
I support the death penalty for 
those who kill during a robbery. 
3.953 3.763 .919 142 .180 
I support the death penalty for 
those who kill during a 
kidnapping for ransom. 
4.125 3.975 .763 142 .224 
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 Pre Mean Post Mean t df Sig. (1-tail) 
I support the death penalty for 
rapists who do not kill their 
victims. 
3.206 2.975 .957 141 .170 
I could pull the lever to initiate an 
execution by lethal gas (gas 
chamber). 
2.906 2.813 .377 142 .353 
I could pull the trigger in a firing 
squad. 
2.781 2.913 -.527 142 .300 
I could pull the gallows lever in a 
hanging execution. 
2.703 2.788 -.340 142 .367 
I could flip the switch in an 
execution by electrocution. 
2.828 2.886 -.228 141 .410 
I could inject the chemicals in a 
lethal injection execution. 
2.750 2.738 .051 142 .480 
I could witness an execution. 3.313 3.250 .264 142 .396 
If I were a member of a jury in a 
death penalty case, I could 
sentence a defendant to death if 
the evidence supported it.  




Comparison of means: LWOP as an alternative to death penalty 
                                         COMP              EXP 
 Pre Post Pre Post 
N 64 80 82 94 
% 44.4 55.5 46.5 53.5 
Mean 3.500 3.563 3.488 3.926
sd 1.260 1.271 1.250 1.080
seM .157 .142 .138 .111 
t -.294 -2.493
df 142 174 















Comparison of means: LWOP + as a death penalty alternative 
                                                                COMP             EXP 
 Pre Post Pre Post 
N 64 80 82 91 
% 44.4 55.5 47.4 52.6 
Mean 4.110 3.888 3.712 4.297
sd .994 1.158 1.103 .810 
seM .124 .130 .122 .085 
t 1.216 -3.949
df 142 171 






Hypothesis III: If the primary reason people support capital punishment is based on the principle 
of retribution, then increased knowledge about the subject would make little or no difference to 
their death penalty opinions 
 As described in the methodology section, a retribution index was employed to measure 
the level of retribution in the experimental and comparison group. To test Marshall’s third 
hypothesis, experimental and comparison group subjects were divided into those who scored 
“high” on the retribution measure and those who scored “low” on it. The response categories to 
the retribution items ranged from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” on a five-point Likert 
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scale. These items were combined into an index, which provided individual scores from zero to 
25. The mean and median scores of the four groups (comparison pretest, comparison posttest, 
experimental pretest, and experimental posttest) were all approximately 17. Therefore, subjects 
with retribution scores of 17 or less were considered “low” on the retribution scale, and those 
with scores of above 17 were considered to be high on the retribution scale.  
  Then, changes between pretest and posttest were examined for each of these groups on 
the 19 death penalty opinion measures using one-tailed independent t-tests. Results show a 
statistically significant change for the experimental group on only two items: LWOP and 
LWOP+. However, contrary to Justice Marshall’s expectation, for LWOP and LWOP+ a 
statistically significant change occurred for both “low” retributivists and “high” retributivists 




Experimental Group “Low” Retributivists: Pretest v. Posttest 
Condition Pre/Post N Mean SD Std. Error of Mean 
Death Penalty Pre 38 3.0526 1.31411 .21318 
 Post 45 3.5333 1.53149 .22830 
LWOP Pre 38 3.8158 1.13555 .18421 
 Post 46 4.2391 .89901 .13255 
LWOP + Pre 38 3.8684 .99107 .16077 
 Post 43 4.4186 .79380 .12105 
 
Condition t df Sig. (1-tailed) Mean Difference 
Death Penalty -1.519 81 .070 -.48070 
LWOP -1.907 82 .030 -.42334 











Experimental Group “High” Retributivists: Pretest v. Posttest 
Condition Pre/Post N Mean SD Std. Error of Mean 
Death Penalty Pre 44 3.7955 1.21195 .18271 
 Post 48 3.4375 1.50044 .21657 
LWOP Pre 44 3.2045 1.28641 .19393 
 Post 48 3.6250 1.16006 .16744 
LWOP + Pre 44 3.5909 1.18750 .17902 
 Post 48 4.1875 .81623 .11781 
 
Condition t df Sig. (1-tailed) Mean Difference 
Death Penalty 1.252 90 .107 .35795 
LWOP -1.648 90 .050 -.42045 
LWOP+ -2.828 80 .003 -.59659 
 
Marshall did not expect “high” retributivists to change their death penalty opinions. 
There were no other statistically significant changes for the experimental group on the other 
death penalty opinion measures or for the comparison group on any of the other death penalty 
opinion measures (see Tables 10 and 11). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 This thesis tested three hypotheses suggested by former Supreme Court Justice Thurgood 
Marshall in his Furman opinion. Marshall’s first hypothesis –“The American people are largely 
ignorant about the administration of capital punishment” –was supported by the results of this 
thesis. On average, the experimental group initially answered only about 39 percent of the 21 
knowledge items correctly, and the comparison group initially answered only about 32 percent of 
the 21 knowledge items correctly. Although Marshall did not stipulate how much death penalty 
knowledge a person must possess to be considered informed about the subject, he surely would 
not have considered answering only 32 percent or 39 percent of knowledge items correctly as 
being well informed. This conclusion is more compelling because many of the experimental and 
comparison group subjects were criminal justice majors or minors and probably were exposed to 
at least some death penalty information in other criminal justice classes.  One wonders how 
much knowledge would be found in a sample drawn from outside a criminal justice or, indeed, a 
university environment. This is certainly a subject for future research. 
Marshall’s second hypothesis –“An informed American public would not support the 
death penalty” –was only partially supported by the data. The experimental (informed) group did 
not change their death penalty support (to a statistically significant degree) for “some people 
convicted of first-degree murder” or for the 16 concrete items.  The only statistically significant 
changes in the experimental group were on the two alternative items: LWOP and LWOP +. 
Although Marshall never discussed these two alternatives in his Furman decision, this thesis 
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shows that informed subjects would support either LWOP or LWOP + as an alternative to the 
death penalty more than less informed subjects. 
The data support Marshall’s third hypothesis –“If the primary reason people support 
capital punishment is based on the principle of retribution, then increased knowledge about the 
subject would make little or no difference to their death penalty opinions.” After exposure to 
death penalty knowledge, subjects who scored “high” on the retribution index did not change (to 
a statistically significant degree) their death penalty opinion for “some people convicted of first-
degree murder” or for any of the concrete items. What Marshall did not anticipate, and a finding 
of this thesis, was that subjects who scored “low” on the retribution index also did not change 
their death penalty opinion for any of those items after exposure to the experimental stimulus. 
Thus, at least in this thesis, a subject’s level of retribution does not appear to be the sole reason 
that a subject might be impervious to death penalty knowledge for these measures of death 
penalty opinion. This finding is unique in the literature; thus, further research of it is warranted. 
The only statistically significant findings with regard to retribution were for the LWOP 
and LWOP+ items. Experimental group subjects who scored both “high” and “low” on the 
retribution index increased their support for both LWOP and LWOP+ to a statistically significant 
degree. Again, although Marshall did not discuss LWOP or LWOP+ as alternatives to the death 
penalty in his third hypothesis, the finding about subjects who scored “high” on the retribution 
index does not support Marshall’s general contention about informed retributivists’ death penalty 
opinions being obdurate. The second finding about subjects who scored “low” on the retribution 
scale being supportive of LWOP and LWOP+ was expected. As noted above, these findings 
should be researched further. 
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In sum, results of this thesis provide unqualified support for Marshall’s first hypothesis 
and partial support for his second and third hypotheses. Thus, findings for hypothesis one are 
consistent with previous studies, while the results for hypotheses two and three differ in some 
ways from the findings of previous research. Five findings were unique to this thesis. First was 
the finding that death penalty knowledge did not have a statistically significant effect on any of 
the 16 concrete measures of death penalty opinion. Second was the finding that death penalty 
knowledge produced a majority of subjects willing to support LWOP and LWOP+ as alternatives 
to the death penalty. Third, although the finding that experimental group subjects who scored 
“high” on the retribution scale did not change their death penalty opinion for “some people 
convicted of first-degree murder” or for any of the concrete items was expected, the finding that 
experimental group subjects who scored “low” on the retribution scale also were intransigent on 
these measures was not expected. The fourth unique finding of this thesis was that experimental 
group subjects who scored both “high” and “low” on the retribution scale increased their support 
for both LWOP and LWOP+ as alternatives to the death penalty. Fifth, results of this thesis 
showed that exposure to death penalty knowledge did not alter subjects’ scores on the retribution 
index. In fact, an examination of retribution score means for both experimental and comparison 
group subjects showed almost no change between pretest and posttest. In other words, results of 
this thesis suggest that “once a retributivist always a retributivist.” 
As noted, three “abstract” and 16 “concrete” death penalty opinion measures were 
employed in this thesis. Previous research has found that death penalty opinion question type and 
response categories can affect results (see Ellsworth and Ross, 1983; Williams et al, 1988; Bohm 
et al., 1991). Specifically, results have been found to vary depending on whether the death 
opinion question is “abstract” or “concrete.” “Concrete” items used in this thesis included 
 57
whether a person, as a member of jury in a death penalty case, could sentence a defendant to 
death if the evidence supported it; whether a person could witness an execution; and whether a 
person could pull the lever to initiate an execution by lethal gas, pull the trigger in a firing squad 
execution, pull the gallows lever in a hanging execution, flip the switch in an execution by 
electrocution, or inject the chemicals in a lethal injection execution. Although these items are not 
the same as actually serving on a jury in a capital case or participating in an execution, they are 
more “concrete” than simply asking whether a person favors or opposes the death penalty for 
some people convicted of first-degree murder.  Still, research shows that what a person says and 
what a person does are often very different (see Wicker, 1969).  
Another methodological weakness involved the samples. As noted previously, some 
subjects only took the pretest (e.g., those students who dropped the class before the posttest was 
administered), and some students only took the posttest (e.g., those students who added the class 
after the pretest was administered). A problem was that these students could not be identified 
because questionnaires did not ask for names or any other identifying information. What is 
known is that 13 more students in the experimental group and 16 more students in the 
comparison group took the posttest. Thus, the pretest-posttest experimental and comparison 
groups were not equivalent and caution should be exercised when interpreting changes in means.    
Further research on this subject should employ true experimental designs with randomly 
selected and assigned experimental and comparison groups. The groups should be large enough 
and diverse enough to be able to more confidently generalize findings. If a classroom experience 
is used as the experimental stimulus it should be varied from the type of experience used in 
previous research. For example a class could be team-taught with a death penalty opponent and 
proponent as instructors, or a class could be taught by a death penalty proponent to compare 
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findings from that class with classes taught by death penalty opponents Other experimental 
stimuli besides a classroom experience also should be utilized in future research, such as 
extensions to the rudimentary Sarat and Vidmar (1976), Lord et al. (1979), Vidmar and 
Dittenhoffer (1981) “essay stimuli,” death-row visits, witnessing an execution, witnessing a 
capital trial, serving on a capital jury, and monitoring pro- and anti-death penalty groups (see 
Bohm, 1990). 
Finally, no previous study has examined a possible “testing threat.” Future research 
should use a Solomon Four Group design to remedy this problem.  
This thesis does not fully support Justice Marshall’s contention that a knowledgeable 
public would oppose the death penalty, if Marshall had in mind that knowledge would be 
achieved by participation in a death penalty class such as the one used in this thesis. That does 
not mean that death penalty knowledge cannot change death penalty opinions. In this thesis, it 
did for LWOP and LWOP+. Rather, it only means that it likely does not change death penalty 
opinions significantly under the other specific conditions of this thesis and similar studies. 
Clearly, more research using different conditions is warranted.  
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APPENDIX A: 
CCJ 4361-0001: DEATH PENALTY FALL, 2006 
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INSTRUCTOR:  Professor Robert M. Bohm 
OFFICE:  Room 362 HPA     PHONE:  823-5944 
EMAIL:  rbohm@mail.ucf.edu 
OFFICE HOURS: TR, 12:20-1:20 and 2:50-4:20 or by appt.  
CLASS MEETINGS: 4:30-5:45, TR, HPA 112 
 
REQUIRED TEXT: Bohm, Robert M. (2003) Deathquest II: An Introduction to the Theory and 
Practice of Capital Punishment in the United States, Second Edition. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson 
Publishing Co.   
   
COURSE OBJECTIVES: 
1. To learn about the death penalty in the United States, especially its administration under 
current statutes. 
2. To provide an opportunity to discuss issues about the death penalty that the student finds 
troublesome or about which the student seeks clarification. 
3. To help the student develop critical thinking abilities. 
4. To allow the student to develop an informed opinion about the death penalty. 
 
COURSE DESCRIPTION AND REQUIREMENTS: 
1. Each chapter will be introduced with a PowerPoint presentation, summarizing the main 
points of the chapter. At the end of each presentation, students should be prepared to 
respond to end of chapter discussion questions. Other relevant questions will also be 
addressed. Discussion is encouraged. 
2. Satisfactory performance on three examinations. Exams will be given during the class period 
following the completion of each section as indicated on the course outline. Learning objectives 
for each chapter /exam are attached to the syllabus and should be used for class and exam 
preparation. Exams include multiple choice and true-false items and cover reading assignments, 
presentations, videos, and anything discussed in class. Each exam covers only the material in a 
particular section. Three raspberry-colored scantron sheets, one for each exam, are required. Use of 
#2 pencils with good erasers is suggested. Grades are based on the percentage of items answered 
correctly. A conventional scale (i.e., A = 90-100%, B = 80-89%, etc.) will be employed. No plus 
or minus grades are given. Each exam counts as one-third of the final grade. Make-up exams are 
given in only exceptional circumstances (e.g., commitment to a hospital), otherwise missed exams 
are recorded as zeros.  
 
Students may pick up their exam results from their professor during his office hours anytime 
during the semester. Students who wish to examine their results with a copy of the exam booklet 
may do during their professor’s office hours anytime during the semester. Alternatively, students 
may access their exam grades anytime after they have been posted by using “myUCF Grades” on 
the UCF website. If you need help accessing myUCF Grades, see the online tutorial at 
https://myucfgrades.ucf.edu/help/.Exam grades are not provided by phone or email. 
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  1. History of the Death Penalty in the U.S. Chap. 1 
  2. Capital Punishment and the Supreme Court Chap. 2 








  3. Current Data  None 
  4. The Federal Death Penalty and the Military Chap. 3 
  5. Methods of Execution Chap. 4 
  6. General Deterrence Chap. 5 










  8. Miscarriages of Justice  Chap. 7 
  9. Arbitrariness and Discrimination Chap. 8  
10.Retribution and Religion Chap. 9 
11.Death Penalty Opinion Chap. 10 
 
Exam #3 (Thurs., April 27 @ 4 p.m.) 
 
All UCF students have the responsibility to be familiar with and to observe the requirements of 
the Rules of Conduct described in The Golden Rule:  A Handbook for Students, which may be 
obtained from the Office of Student Rights and Responsibilities, Student Resource Center, Rm. 
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Section I: Opinion Items 
Instructions: This first section seeks information about your death penalty opinions. Please draw 
a line through the letter corresponding to your response for each item. In this section draw a line 
through the A, if you strongly agree with the item; B, if you agree with the item; C, if you are 
undecided; D, if you disagree with the item; and E if you strongly disagree with the item.  
1. I support the death penalty for all people convicted of first-degree murder.  
2. I support the death penalty for only some people convicted of first-degree murder.  
3. I support the death penalty for the adult murderers of children.  
4. I support the death penalty for murderers of law enforcement officers.  
5. I support the death penalty for murderers of correctional officers / prison guards.  
6. I support the death penalty for prisoners who murder fellow inmates.  
7. I support the death penalty for serial killers.  
8. I support the death penalty for those who kill during a rape.  
9. I support the death penalty for those who kill during a robbery.  
10. I support the death penalty for those who kill during a kidnapping for ransom.  
11. I support the death penalty for rapists who do not kill their victims.  
12. I support life in prison without the possibility of parole as an alternative to the death 
penalty.  
13. As an alternative to the death penalty, I support life in prison without the possibility of 
parole plus forcing the inmate to work in prison industry and give all his/her earnings to 
the victim’s family or the community.  
14. I could pull the lever to initiate an execution by lethal gas (gas chamber).  
15. I could pull the trigger in a firing squad execution.  
16. I could pull the gallows lever in a hanging execution.  
17. I could flip the switch in an execution by electrocution.  
18. I could inject the chemicals in a lethal injection execution.  
19. I could witness an execution.  
20. I believe the death penalty prevents would-be killers from killing more than a non-capital 
punishment, such as long-term imprisonment.  
21. I believe that an individual who deliberately takes a human life automatically forfeits 
his/hers.  
22. I believe the government has the right to kill in certain circumstances.  
23. I believe innocent individuals have been executed in the last 30 years.  
24. The possibility of innocent individuals being executed concerns me enough to change my 
views on the death penalty.  
25. I believe the poor generally get good legal representation in death penalty trials.  
26. I believe white jurors are more likely to sentence a black man to death than they are to 
sentence a white man to death.  
27. If I were a member of a jury in a death penalty case, I could sentence a defendant to death 
if the evidence supported it.  
28. I believe that black jurors are more likely to sentence a white man to death than they are 
to sentence a black man to death.  
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29. I believe lawyers use race in determining who serves on a jury.  
30. I believe the number of appeals available in death penalty cases needs to be reduced.  
31. The death penalty is “purposeless vengeance”.  
32. I support the death penalty because it prevents killers from killing again.  
33. I support the death penalty because it prevents many “would-be” killers from killing.  
34. I believe the main purpose of the death penalty is retribution / revenge.  
35. Sometimes I have a sense of personal outrage when a convicted murderer is sentenced to 
a penalty less than death.  
36. When I hear about an execution it makes me sad, regardless of the crime the individual 
committed.  
Section II: Knowledge Items 
Instructions: This section attempts to discover what you know about the death penalty. If you 
think the statement is true, then draw a line through A; if you think the statement is false, then 
draw a line through B; and if you don’t know whether a statement is true or false, then draw a 
line through C.  
37. It is generally cheaper to pursue a death penalty and execution, than to incarcerate an 
individual for the rest of his/her natural life.  
38. Hanging is still authorized in the United States as a method of execution.  
39. More blacks have been executed than whites in the last 30 years.  
40. According to the United States Supreme Court, the mentally retarded can be executed in 
the United States today.  
41. According to the United States Supreme Court, 16-year-olds can be sentenced to death in 
the United States today.  
42. In some states, lethal injection is not an option.  Electrocution is the only authorized 
method of execution.  
43. Typically, a capital defendant sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole 
could be released after serving 10 years in prison.  
44. Research shows that many police chiefs in the United States believe that the death 
penalty prevents crime.  
45. Research has shown that lethal injection can be extremely painful for the condemned.  
46. Research shows states that have the death penalty experience lower homicide rates than 
states that do not have the death penalty.  
47. More than 120 people have been released from death row during the last 30 years 
because they have been found to be innocent of the crime for which they were originally 
sentenced.  
48. Research shows that less than 10% of the fully reviewed state capital cases between 1973 
and 1995 were infected by serious, reversible error.  
49. When compared to the number of people sentenced to death, very few people are actually 
executed.  
50. Compared to other types of cases, the United States Supreme Court spends very little 
time on death penalty cases.  
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51. As societies evolve, they tend to abolish the death penalty.  
52. Since 1994 (to the present day), public support for the death penalty has fallen from about 
80% to about 65%.  
53. It is much more likely that a black killer of a white victim will receive the death penalty 
than it is for a white killer of a black victim, or a black killer of a black victim.  
54. Defense attorneys in death penalty cases have been known to be drunk or asleep during 
trials.  
55. The majority of the countries of the world have a death penalty.  
56. Most murderers who are released from prison do not commit violent crimes again.  
57. The official position of most mainstream religious organizations in the United States 
today is in support of the death penalty.  
Section III: Demographic Items 
Instructions: In this section we seek information about you as an individual. In this section, draw 
a line through the letter corresponding to your response for each item.  
58. What is your gender? A = Male; B = Female  
59. Which of the following describes your religion? A = Catholic; B = Christian, non-
Catholic ; C = Jewish; D = Muslim; E = Other (including atheist)  
60. How religious do you consider yourself to be? A = Very religious; B = Somewhat 
religious; C = Not religious  
61. What is your political affiliation? A = Democrat; B = Republican; C = Independent; D = 
Other  
62. What race are you? A = Black; B = Hispanic; C = White; D = Asian; E = Other.  
63. Does your father support the death penalty? A = Yes; B = No; C = Don’t know  
64. Does your mother support the death penalty? A = Yes; B = No; C = Don’t Know  
65. Have you or a close friend/family member ever been the victim of violent crime? A = 
Yes; B = No; C = Don’t know  
66. How much do you know about the death penalty? A = Very much; B = Some; C = Very 
little; D = Nothing.  
67. How afraid are you of becoming a victim of violent crime? A = Very afraid; B = 
Somewhat afraid; C= Not afraid; D=; Don’t know  
 This is the end of the survey. Thank you so much for your participation!  
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